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Price dispersion, i.e. a homogeneous product sold at different prices by different sellers, is among 
the most replicated findings in empirical economics. The paper assesses the extent and determinants 
of spatial price dispersion for 14 perfectly homogeneous food products in more than 400 retailers in 
a market characterized by the persistence of a large number of relatively small traditional food 
stores, side by side large supermarkets. The extent of observed price dispersion is quite high, 
suggesting that monopolistic competition prevails as a result of the heterogeneity of services offered. 
When prices in an urban area (where the spatial concentration of sellers is much higher and 
consumer search costs significantly lower) have been compared with those in smaller towns and 
rural areas, differences in search costs and the potentially higher degree of competition did not yield 
lower prices; quite the contrary, they were, on average, higher for 11 of the 14 products considered. 
Supermarkets proved to be often, but not always, less expensive than traditional retailers, although 
average savings from food shopping at supermarkets were extremely low. Finally, the results of the 
study suggest that sellers behave differently in their pricing strategies; these differences emerge both 
at the firm level, and for supermarkets within the same chain. The fact that products considered were 
homogeneous, purchases frequently repeated, the number of sellers large, and search costs relatively 
low, did not suffice to keep price dispersion low. From the results presented in the paper, it is clear 
that what is important in explaining price dispersion is the contemporaneous heterogeneity of 
retailers (in terms of services) and consumers (in terms of search and shopping preferences), which 
makes it possible for a monopolistic competition structure of the market to emerge and for small 
traditional food retailers to remain in business.   
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Price dispersion, search costs and consumers and sellers heterogeneity in retail food markets 
1. Introduction  
The existence of price dispersion, even for  homogeneous products, is among the most replicated 
findings in empirical economics. After Stigler’s (1961) seminal paper, a rich literature flourished, 
both theoretical and empirical, analyzing the causes and consequences of such “ubiquitous”  price 
dispersion.
1  
The paper aims to contribute to the empirical literature by assessing the extent and determinants 
of spatial price dispersion for 14 perfectly homogeneous food products. To the best of our 
knowledge, this study is the only one conducted in a market characterized by the strong persistence 
of traditional food retailers (i.e. small shops sometimes specializing in selling one specific category 
of food product only, such as bread, fresh fruit and vegetables, fish, meat, etc). We found only three 
studies addressing price dispersion for food products in Europe (Bahadir-Lust et al., 2007; Lloyd et 
al., 2009; Griffith et al., 2009).  
In addition to measuring the extent of price dispersion, the paper attempts to answer several 
questions related to its determinants which emerge from the alternative theoretical models proposed 
in the literature. These questions include: How relevant are promotional sales in explaining spatial 
price dispersion? How important is seller heterogeneity in explaining price dispersion, i.e. are 
consumer prices higher in traditional food retailers than in supermarkets? Is price dispersion greater 
in supermarkets than in traditional small stores? Is price dispersion within each supermarket chain 
smaller than between all supermarkets? Are prices and price dispersion higher in smaller towns and 
rural communities, where search costs can be assumed to be higher, than in urban settings? Do 
low/high price setters remain so over time?  
We believe the results of our study may be relevant for more general frameworks than the specific 
one considered, those characterized by perfectly homogeneous, well known products, involving 
frequently repeated purchases, with relatively low unit prices, sold by a large number of 
heterogeneous stores and bought by a large number of heterogeneous consumers. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section briefly recalls the main theories which have 
been proposed to explain price dispersion; section three provides an overview of relevant empirical 
contributions assessing the extent and determinants of price dispersion; section four presents the 
results of our study and section five concludes by discussing their implications and significance. 
                                                           
1 Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2006) provide a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on price dispersion.     
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2. Why price dispersion? 
There is no unique explanation of why price dispersion arises. Many studies agree that a good 
portion of observed price dispersion stems from the existence of information (search) costs.  In his 
seminal paper Stigler (1961) considers price dispersion as a measure of ignorance of the market: 
nobody can possibly know all the prices quoted by different sellers at any given time, and any agent 
who wishes to ascertain the lowest price must do a search that involves a cost. In his model 
consumers search strategy involves canvassing a fixed sample of n firms and then buying at the 
minimum asking price. The optimal amount of search n* is determined a priori and corresponds to 
the number of firms which makes the marginal cost of search equal to its expected marginal return; 
this varies among individuals mostly because of differences in search costs. The persistence of price 
dispersion has been explained in different ways: first of all, the fact that knowledge becomes 
obsolete as supply and demand, and therefore the distribution of asking prices, change over time; 
buyers and sellers change and new agents enter the market with no prior information on prices; 
finally, as the market grows, there is a strong tendency towards monopoly in the provision of 
information. Rothschild (1973) criticizes Stigler’s model as a “partial-partial equilibrium theory” (p. 
1288), in the sense that it considers only one side of the market, the consumer, acting in an 
optimizing fashion, while firms do not make an optimal use of the information they possess because 
in Stigler, although price setters know how buyers search, they do not make use of this information 
in their decision making.  
Notwithstanding the fact that Stigler does not believe that all price dispersion is attributable to 
heterogeneity, the literature expanding on his theory mostly focuses on models with differences in 
search and production costs as factors generating the dispersion. Examples include Burdett and Judd 
(1983), Carlson and McAfee (1983), Salop (1977), Salop and Stiglitz (1977), and Stahl (1989). 
Carlson and  McAfee (1983) develop an equilibrium price dispersion model where a finite number 
of firms differ in their cost functions and consumers have different search costs. One of the 
predictions of the model is that as the number of firms increases the variance of prices rises. Salop 
and Stiglitz (1977) consider a market with both “low information cost” consumers, who are 
supposed to have full information regarding the distribution of offered prices, and “high information 
cost” consumers, who know nothing. The former always purchase from a low-priced store, while the 
latter purchase at a randomly chosen store. Stores are identical and behave as monopolistically 
competitive price setters. It is shown that in equilibrium every store earns zero profits, for prices 
must equal average costs, and high-priced stores sell a smaller quantity than lower-priced ones. 
Low-priced stores sell at the competitive price (minimum average cost), while the other stores sell at 
a higher price and only to uninformed consumers. Stahl (1989) focuses on the case of two types of    
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consumers about whom stores have no individual information: a proportion µ of consumers, named 
“shoppers”, derive enjoyment from shopping and are assumed to be costless searchers; the 
remaining proportion 1 - µ of consumers have an identical positive search cost c. N identical stores 
with constant marginal costs compete in the market of a homogeneous good. A two-stage model is 
considered, where in the first stage each store fixes the price and in the second stage consumers 
adopt an optimal sequential strategy with perfect recall. When µ = 1 and µ = 0 the marginal cost 
price (Betrand result) and monopolistic price (Diamond result), respectively, occur. As µ goes from 
0 to 1 and the search cost goes from c to 0 there is a Nash equilibrium price distribution that moves 
smoothly from “monopoly pricing” to “marginal cost pricing”. Moreover, in this model, as in 
Carlson and McAfee (1983), entry does not lead to a competitive outcome, the reason here being 
that, as the number of stores increases, the probability of any one of them being the lowest-priced 
store decreases, thus reducing the incentive for lowering the price. Janssen and Moraga-Gonzales 
(2004) present an oligopoly model where some consumers search costlessly. They prove that the 
expected price does not necessarily increase in the number of firms, but rather it depends on the 
different grades (low, medium or high) of search intensity. However, as the number of firms tends to 
infinity the expected price increases, except in the case of low search intensity. Waldeck (2008) 
extends the Stahl (1989) model and shows how, as the proportion of informed consumers rises,  the 
mean price increases, while price dispersion exhibits  a reverse U-shaped pattern. This approaches 
zero when search  intensity is very low, then it increases as search increases, and eventually falls 
when the proportion of informed consumers approaches one.  
When consumers are heterogeneous in their search behaviors and exhibit different efficiencies in 
gathering information, a further reason for price dispersion arises, i.e. firms behaving as 
discriminating monopolists. In this case price dispersion acts as a device for splitting the market in 
two, with the more efficient information gatherers, on one side, and the less efficient ones on the 
other. Thus, monopolists can charge the latter, who are supposed to have a more price inelastic 
demand function, a higher price (Salop 1977). 
The literature on price dispersion contemplates four different typologies of consumer search 
strategy. Stigler (1961), Burdett and Judd (1983), Mac Minn (1980), Wilde and Schwartz (1979), 
Janssen and Moraga-Gonzales (2004), among others, consider a “fixed sample size” consumer 
search, while Diamond (1971), Carlson and McAfee (1983), Reinganum (1979), Robert and Stahl 
(1993) and Stahl (1989) assume “sequential” consumer search; Burdett and Judd (1983) consider 
also a noisy sequential search; finally, Rosenthal (1980), Varian (1980), Baye and Morgan (2001), 




2 In a fixed sample size search consumers decide the number of prices to observe 
prior to starting their search, so the problem is determining how many price quotations to collect. In 
a sequential search  consumers observe a price quotation and then decide whether to ask for another 
price quotation or make the purchase at the lowest price observed up to that point. In a noisy 
sequential search consumers pay a cost to obtain an unknown number of price quotations, as 
happens when consumers purchase a newspaper in which they know they will certainly find one 
price for the good they want to buy, but it is possible that the newspaper contains more than one 
price quotation. After collecting the price(s) provided in the newspaper the consumer either 
purchases at the lowest price observed, or decides to keep searching and buys another newspaper. 
An information clearinghouse search technique consists in observing an extensive list of prices 
charged by different firms in the market by means of specialized newspapers or on-line websites.  
Stigler’s fixed sample size rule has been criticized as unrealistic, because it implies that the 
information consumers accumulate during the search does not affect their decision to canvass all the 
sample chosen ex ante (Rothshild, 1973). As a consequence, several authors conclude that a 
sequential strategy would be a more appropriate assumption regarding consumer search behavior. 
Morgan and Manning (1985), Burdett and Judd (1983), Wilde and Schwartz (1983) and Waldeck 
(2008) show, however, that both types of search can be optimal: the key advantage of a fixed sample 
search is that the price for the number of firms decided a priori can be collected at the same time, 
hence rapid information gathering; on the contrary, a sequential search would be more efficient 
when the acceptable price can be found early in the search, thereby allowing consumers to save on 
information search costs (otherwise it could take a significant amount of time to wait for each new 
price quotation before deciding whether to search further or not, with the consequent increase in 
search costs). Burdett and Judd (1983) propose a model in which both firms and consumers are 
identical, but some of the latter observe just one price, while others collect more than one. 
Information is costly to consumers. Equilibrium price dispersion occurs because, if there is a 
positive probability that some firms sell at a given price, other firms will find it profitable to sell the 
product at a slightly lower price in order to capture the better informed consumers; on the other 
hand, it is also profitable for other firms to set their prices higher and sell only to those consumers 
who observe just one price offer. McAfee (1995) extends the Burdett and Judd model to the case of 
many goods. 
In line with Stigler’s insight, other contributions consider price dispersion as endogenously 
generated. Butters (1977) pioneering paper determines price dispersion with identical firms and 
                                                           
2 “Information clearinghouse” is a term to indicate both newspapers and internet price comparison websites (Baye at al. 
2006).    
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consumers by firm randomization. Varian (1980) presents a model in which price dispersion is due 
to the randomization behavior adopted by identical firms and shows how consumer information 
asymmetries, initially considered as exogenous, can be made endogenous by introducing a cost for 
learning every price. Given that informed customers get a lower price than uninformed ones, the 
decision to become informed depends on the comparison between the “full price”, inclusive of the 
cost of becoming informed, and the price paid when the store is chosen randomly.  He distinguishes 
between “spatial” price dispersion – i.e. different stores contemporaneously offering identical items 
at different prices - and  “temporal” price dispersion – i.e. stores varying their selling price for a 
given commodity over time, for example by means of promotional sales. He argues that the former 
may exist only if the latter occurs. In fact, with temporal price dispersion consumers are unable to 
learn from experience which stores systematically charge low prices, and spatial price dispersion 
would be unlikely to persist if consumers could learn from experience which firms charge the lowest 
prices. In the Salop and Stiglitz (1982) model all individuals are ex ante identical, and information 
imperfect and costly. By chance, some consumers happen to shop at low-price stores, while others 
shop at high-price stores; they randomly select a store in period 1, so whether they pay a good price 
or not depends only on the luck of the draw. It is assumed that consumers have the possibility of 
starting a new search at period 2. Consumers demand one unit of the good each period, but may 
either purchase just one unit in period 1, facing an additional transaction cost in re-entering the 
market in period 2; or they may decide to purchase two units in period 1 and store the unit in excess 
of the immediate consumption for the next period, incurring a storage cost. The decision to buy-and-
store or shop again stems from the comparison of these two options. High-price stores earn higher 
profits per sale, but low price stores realize a higher volume of sales. Equilibrium price dispersion 
entails equal profits for the two types of stores, i.e. the larger volume of sales of low-price stores 
fully compensates for the larger profit margin of high-price stores. Burdett and Judd (1983) show 
that price dispersion may be independent of any form of ex ante agent heterogeneity. Considering 
consumers and firms identical and fully rational, they show that, for equilibrium price dispersion, ex 
post heterogeneity in consumer information is crucial, that is a divergence in the amount of 
information each consumer holds after searching. They demonstrate that a dispersed price 
equilibrium can exist both with noisy and non sequential searches.  
Hong et al. (2002) account for price dispersion in the presence of promotional sales of storable 
goods, which consumers can stock up when prices are low.
3 Consumer inventories will induce a 
                                                           
3 Other models which take sales into account are those in Butters (1977), Varian (1980), Burdett and Judd (1983), Robert and Stahl 
(1993) and McAfee (1994, 1995), although  they do not consider explicitly the role of inventories in generating price dispersion, 
nor price correlation over time. Berck et al. (2008), Hosken and Reiffen (2004) and Lloyd et al. (2009) test empirically some of 
these models.    
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negative serial price correlation, with promotional sales followed by relatively high prices. In fact, a 
promotional sale of a storable good induces the more price sensitive consumers to stock up. Thus, 
after the promotional sale the more price-sensitive consumers are out-of-the market and  firms will 
raise the price in order to extract maximum revenue from the price-insensitive consumers. One 
important result of the model is that when consumer inventories are high, the monopoly price will be 
charged, while when inventories are low firms will price more competitively in order to attract  the 
more price-sensitive consumers. The model is tested empirically by using data on prices and 
quantities for branded grocery products. In line with the model’s predictions, they found that grocery 
store items have a “regular” price that is charged frequently and may be viewed as a monopoly price 
to be charged to the price-insensitive consumers. 
Finally, there are alternative theoretical approaches to price dispersion which do not consider 
consumer search costs as the main determinant, but stress the importance of heterogeneity in 
consumers and/or firms in generating it. Frequently cited factors other than search costs include: 
price discrimination in the presence of consumers who do not engage in searches, regardless of cost; 
heterogeneity of retailers in terms of the quantity and quality of services offered (e.g. opening hours, 
cleanliness, number of references to choose from, location, parking convenience, credit card 
payments, store layout reducing shopping time, delays at check-out); trust/reputation; degree of 
competition; promotional sales; and bounded rationality of consumers and/or firms. 
3. Price dispersion in empirical analyses  
Empirical evidence of spatial price dispersion has been found in virtually all markets which have 
been investigated, including automobiles (Dahlby and West, 1986), air travel (Borenstein and Rose, 
1994; Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009), services (Pratt et al. 1979), gasoline and products sold in gas 
station stores (Adams, 1997; Barron et al., 2004; Lewis 2008), books and CDs (Ancarani and 
Shankar, 2004; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Clay et al, 1999; Clay et al. 2001), scanners and 
digital cameras (Baylis and Perloff, 2002; Haynes and Thompson, 2008), and prescription drugs 
(Sorensen, 2000).  
Dahlby and West (1986) find that price dispersion in automobile insurance in Alberta increases 
with competition and could be explained by the cost of consumer search. Borenstein and Rose 
(1994) analyze air fares charged in 1986 by the 11 major U.S. airlines for coach seating on domestic 
flights. The expected absolute difference in fares between two passengers on the same route was 36 
percent of the average ticket price for that route. Fare dispersion turned out to be smaller across 
carriers than across customers of the same carrier. Considering thirty-nine products and services, for 
which, on average, twelve price quotations in the Boston area were collected, Pratt et al. (1979)    
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gathered evidence of notable price dispersion. Adams (1997) finds that price dispersion for gasoline 
was significantly lower than that for 22 items sold by convenience stores located on the same 
premises. Because search costs for consumers of gasoline are lower than those for in-store items 
(prices for gasoline are prominently displayed), he concludes that the observed differences in price 
dispersion support the hypothesis that different search and information costs for consumers explain a 
sizable portion of price dispersion for homogeneous goods. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) consider 
book and CD prices offered by internet and conventional retailers; they find internet retailer price 
ranges of 33 percent for books and 25 percent for CDs (for some books and CDs the range is as 
much as 47 percent), with price dispersion among internet retailers being smaller than among 
conventional ones. Differences in price levels and price dispersion among three different retail types 
(pure-play internet,  bricks-and-mortar, and bricks-and-clicks) in book and CD market are also 
investigated by Ancarani and Shankar (2004). Their results show that pure-play e-tailers exhibit the 
lowest posted prices but not the lowest full price (i.e. including shipping costs); whereas price 
dispersion is lower for pure-play e-tailers, the price range is higher than for the other retail types. 
This suggests that retailers could use posted prices and shipping costs as a means to differentiate 
themselves from one another. Clay et al. (1999) find substantial price dispersion across 13 online 
bookstores, with the average difference between the minimum and maximum price for paperback 
bestsellers being 73 percent. Clay et al.(2001) find a similar result when analyzing 32 online 
bookstores. Tang et al. (2010) examine how changes in consumer search patterns affect retailers’ 
pricing strategy in the internet book market, showing that a one percent increase in shopbot use 
brings a 0.41% decrease in prices and a 1.1% decrease in price dispersion.
4 Baylis and Perloff 
(2002) found significant price dispersion in offers by 49 internet retailers for a digital camera and a 
scanner; the price range was 42 percent of the average price for the camera and 29 percent for the 
scanner. Their study shows that, contrary to expectations, retailers charging high prices provided 
fewer services; this is consistent with differences in firm pricing strategies explained by targeting 
consumers with high or low search costs. They (and others) also find that firms do not take turns in 
undercutting each other, i.e. the high-priced firms remain high-priced and low-priced firms remain 
low-priced over long periods. Haynes and Thompson (2008) analyze price dispersion and price 
levels in shopbot markets using an unbalanced panel of 399 digital camera models. Their findings 
provide evidence that, as the number of sellers rises, prices fall and price dispersion rises. Sorensen 
(2000) focuses on the retail market for prescription drugs and finds that prices for equivalent 
                                                           
4 A shopbot is an internet virtual agent that automatically searches for information on price and other dimensions of a 
given product sold by on-line vendors (Smith 2002; Tang et al. 2010). 
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prescriptions differ substantially across pharmacies within the same small town, with the highest 
price being, on average, 50 percent higher than the lowest one. Differences in service characteristics 
turn out to be relatively unhelpful in explaining price differences. Moreover, pharmacy price 
rankings differ from one drug to another, with a significantly lower price dispersion for drugs 
treating chronic conditions, which are purchased repeatedly.  
Research has systematically found that significant price dispersion exists even in on-line markets, 
where search costs can be assumed to be very low (Baye and Morgan 2001; Baye, Morgan and 
Scholten, 2003; Clay et al., 1999; Clay et al. 2001; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Baylis and 
Perloff, 2002; Haynes and Thompson, 2008; Tang et al., 2010).  
Several studies addressed the extent and determinants of price dispersion with specific reference 
to food products. Ambrose (1979) analyzed prices for 54 grocery products in 6 small independent 
stores, 4 large independent stores and in 4 stores belonging to a chain, located in inner city, suburban 
and rural areas in Nebraska. He found prices to be higher in small independent stores and in stores 
located in rural areas. Leibtag et al. (2010) use Nielsen Homescan data to analyze food purchases by 
about 40,000 US households over the 2004-06 time period. They find prices in nontraditional 
discount food retailers (stores such as Wal-Mart, Costco, and Family Dollar) lower than in 
traditional supermarkets for 82% of the products (having controlled for differences in brand and 
package size); expenditure weighted average prices are 7.5% lower in nontraditional food stores. 
When the analysis is disaggregated at the market level, price differences become smaller as the share 
of nontraditional discount food retailers increases. Lloyd et al. (2009) use a very detailed data base 
of weekly observed prices of over 1,700 grocery products sold in the seven largest retail chains in 
the UK to address the role of promotional sales in price variability over time. They conclude that the 
influence of promotional sales on price variation across the chains is modest, explaining at most 29 
percent of price variability. Significant price dispersion across the seven chains considered emerges 
from the study; even after excluding discount sales, the average difference in the prices of products 
carrying the same bar code is about 25 percent. Griffith et al. (2009) use information on food 
purchases by 25,000 families in Great Britain over the 2006 calendar year to analyze four 
dimensions of their buying behaviors aimed at containing spending: purchasing products offered at 
discounted prices, generic brands, and in bulk, and choosing where to buy. They show that potential 
and actual savings from these four sources are significant. In Israel Lach (2002) found price 
dispersion for four products (three of them food items: frozen chicken, coffee and flour) to be 
significant and to persist even after controlling for unobserved product heterogeneity. Temporal 
price dispersion within stores was significant; most stores were observed to have the lowest and the 
highest price over the length (48 months) of the sample period. Stores moving up and down the    
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cross sectional price distribution implies that consumers cannot learn which stores consistently post 
lower prices; this is a condition for price dispersion to persist. Pesendorfer (2002) analyzes prices of 
two market leader ketchups in 21 supermarkets in Springfield, Missouri over a two year period. 
Prices of Heinz and Hunt’s 32 ounce bottles both show substantial price dispersion on a given day, 
with the lowest price being about 30 percent below the average one. Sexton et al. (2003) address 
retailer behavior in procurement and sale by 20 grocery chains in six U.S. metropolitan markets 
focusing on fresh produce (iceberg lettuce, fresh tomatoes and bagged salads). They conclude that 
retailers do exert oligopoly power in setting prices, but not to the full extent available to them as a 
result of geographical dispersion, brand differentiation and inelastic consumer demands. Hosken and 
Reiffen (2004) consider monthly prices of 20 food products in 30 U.S. metropolitan areas for up to 5 
years. They conclude that grocery products typically have a “regular” price and stay at that price at 
least 50% of the time, most of the deviations from the regular price are downward and promotional 
sales account for 20 to 50 percent of observed annual price variability. Bahadir-Lust et al. (2007) 
analyze data over a 43-week period for 10 food products sold by grocery stores in Germany in order 
to test whether the location of a store on the price distribution curve changes over time. Their results 
show remarkable differences in posted prices over time and across stores, even after controlling for 
their heterogeneity, which accounts for 30% of observed price dispersion. Berck et al. (2008) use 
grocery scanner data from 174 stores in the US to determine the role of food perishability on sales 
patterns. Hong et al. (2002) collected weekly data on prices and quantities for 10 branded grocery 
products, including food products, sold in a single store in Texas finding negative serial correlation 
of prices and quantities. Devine and Marion (1979) conducted an experiment by providing through 
daily newspapers for five weeks consumers in the Ottawa-Hull area with information on prices for 
sixty-five food products in twenty-six local stores. When compared with price developments in a 
control area, the provision of consumers with low cost information on prices induced a decline of 
the level and dispersion of an aggregate price index across stores as well as within chains. 
Contrary to expectations, price dispersion is not observed across retailers only, but within stores 
as well. Quantity surcharges, i.e. the per unit price of a brand’s larger package being higher (rather 
than lower) than the per unit price of the same brand’s smaller package, occurs frequently. Sprott et 
al. (2003) cite research which found quantity surcharges in 16 to 34 percent of grocery supermarket 
brand products available in more than one package size. 
4. Results 
The analysis is based on the results of a survey of retail prices for 14 food items in 437 stores 
located in towns of different demographic sizes in Calabria, a region in Southern Italy. The list of    
11 
 
the 14 food items is given in table 1; they are all processed products, univocally identified by their 
brand, packaging and volume/size. The survey was conducted between April  8 and 11, 2010. 
Unlike other studies that also analyze price dispersion for food products in Europe (Bahadir-Lust et 
al., 2007; Lloyd et al., 2009; Griffith et al., 2009), the stores in our survey do not all belong to a 
supermarket chain, whereas we consider different typologies of sellers (supermarkets and traditional 
food stores). Furthermore, we compare  price dispersion across and within stores in an urban area, 
where seller density is higher and search costs are expected to be lower, with those in smaller towns 
and rural areas.  
Our sample covers 10% of the 4,350 food retail stores operating in Calabria in 2001, at the time of 
the most recent Italian Census of Manufacture and Services.
5 57% of the stores in the sample are 
supermarkets (including very large ones, sometimes referred to as “hypermarkets”), the remaining 
43% are traditional retail stores. Small traditional retailers (specialized food shops in which the 
seller handles most of the items) are 26% of the stores in the sample, while 17% are “superettes” 
(relatively small shops in which buyers have the freedom to pick most of the items from the 
shelves). Supermarkets are over-represented in the sample with respect to their share in the 2001 
Census (5.1%), and traditional retail stores under-represented.  
In total, 4,149 prices are used in the analysis; the number varies between 193 (MILKTDM) and 
386 (NUTELLA), as not all products were sold in every retail store (Table 2). 
How much price dispersion? 
Based on the specific characteristics of the products - perfectly homogeneous, well known to 
consumers and frequently purchased -  and markets - relatively low search costs, because of the high 
number of sellers - considered in this study, theory explaining price variability by assigning a key 
role to search costs and product heterogeneity would lead us to expect a relatively low level of 
spatial price dispersion. However, empirical research conducted in contexts very different from the 
one analyzed here has found food products characterized by a significant degree of price dispersion.  
The results of our survey for the entire sample are presented in table 2. The ratio between the 
maximum and minimum prices for the 14 products ranges between 1.45 (MILKGRA) and 2.96 
(SPAGBAR) and exceeds 2 for 7 out of the 14 products). The significantly lower price dispersion 
for MILKGRA is due to the fact that during the week of the survey the manufacturer distributed it 
with a “suggested” promotional retail price clearly displayed on the label (figure 1); in fact, the 
“suggested” sale price was the observed  retail price in 294 stores out of the 353 selling that specific 
brand of milk. 
                                                           
5 Because of the historical trend towards a rapid reduction of food stores, it is reasonable to assume that the coverage of 
the population of active retail stores in 2010 is significantly larger than 10%.    
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The coefficient of variation - which provides a measure of variability independent of the 
magnitude of the price and, as a result, is directly comparable across products – varies between 4.8% 
(MILKGRA) and 23.5% (YOGDAN); it exceeds 10% in 11 cases (table 2).  
From the results of our survey we can conclude that the extent of the observed spatial price 
dispersion is fairly large. Our results appear to be of the same order of magnitude as those reported 
for a range of different food products in Altroconsumo (2010), Baye et al. (2006; table  1, pp. 325-
330), Degeratu et al. (2000), Lach (2002) and Pesendorfer (2002).  
Price dispersion and its variability around the trend both tend to decline as the average price of the 
food item increases (figure 2); this is likely the result of two interlinked reasons: as the average price 
increases, the same coefficient of variation stems from  wider absolute differences in prices, which 
become more easily detectable by consumers and, most important, more significant in terms of their 
effect on consumer expenditure, increasing their willingness to search.
 In other words, seller pricing 
decisions appear to assume consumers are more concerned with absolute differences in prices than 
percentage ones.
6 
Not only does price dispersion differ across products, but the shape of price distribution appears 
dissimilar as well (figure 3). Four types of distributions emerge. The first one is associated to one 
product only, MILKGRA, which, for the reasons discussed above, shows much less price dispersion 
than all other products, with a very marked concentration of observed prices around the “suggested” 
sale price, and few prices above it. The second type of price dispersion is associated to a clearly 
negative-asymmetric frequency distribution of prices, with the mode interval lying on the right of 
the one containing the average; this type of spatial price dispersion involves 9 of the 14 products. 
This result is consistent with the findings by Hosken and Reiffen (2004), Griffith et al. (2009), Li et 
al. (2006) and Pesendorfer (2002) who analyzed temporal price dispersion in different countries for 
different food products and all conclude that prices typically show a “regular” price, which can be 
observed for a relatively long period of time, with most of the deviations being downward from this 
price and occurring for relatively short periods. The third type of distribution is associated to three 
products (NUTELLA, WATERLEV and SPAGVOI) and shows a relatively symmetric distribution 
of prices around the average. Finally, the price distribution of YOGDAN appears different from all 
the others, with a large number of prices falling in the modal interval and an even larger number of 
prices falling in intervals on its right; 111 retailers out of 285 sell YOGDAN at the same price 
(0.99€), possibly revealing a temporary low price retail strategy by the manufacturer.  
                                                           
6  A slightly negative relation between the coefficient of variation and the price of the products and services considered 
has been found also by Pratt et al. (1979) and Lach (2002).    
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If instead of analyzing the dispersion of the price of each product, the dispersion of the cost of the 
basket of all products analyzed is considered, dispersion drops significantly, signalling that retail 
stores strategically price the products they sell differently, choosing to price some of them below, 
and others above the average. This is consistent with a strategy aimed at making it difficult for 
consumers to identify which stores are selling at prices above average (because they would then 
decide to shop elsewhere) and, at the same time, setting a large number of prices at or above average 
(in order to generate the expected returns). In line with these results, McAfee (1995) suggests that 
prices across goods tend to be negatively correlated, i.e. firms offering some goods at high prices 
will tend to offer others at lower prices. As stated by Bahadir-Lust et al. (2007), if one store 
provides better services it should post higher prices for all products in comparison with other stores. 
Hence, a negative correlation across products suggests that price dispersion cannot be explained by 
store heterogeneity only. A number of authors (Bahadir-Lust et al., 2007; Lewis, 2008; Gerardi and 
Shapiro, 2009; Haynes and Thompson, 2008; Sorensen, 2000) use fixed effects in order to detect 
price differences resulting from seller heterogeneity. All these studies confirm that significant price 
dispersion still emerges even after controlling for store differences. 
There are only 15 retail stores in our sample selling all 14 items. If the analysis is extended to the 
sub-samples of retail stores selling the same basket of 13, 12, 11 and 10 products, choosing in all 
instances the set of products which maximizes the number of retail stores selling them, the ratios 
between the maximum and minimum cost of the basket vary between 1.15 and 1.21, while 
coefficients of variation remain for all 5 baskets below 5% (table 3).   
How relevant are promotional sales in explaining spatial price dispersion? 
One of the factors which can explain price dispersion are promotional sales, which retailers, most 
often supermarkets, use to attract new customers and/or retain current ones. Lloyd et al. (2009) 
analyzed average prices in 7 main food retail chains in the UK over three years to conclude that 
sales have a significant but relatively modest role, smaller than that played by the retailer, in 
explaining price dispersion; overall sales explain 13% of price variability, with percentages for 
individual food product aggregates varying between 2% and 29%. In Hosken and Reiffen (2004) 
sales account for a larger percentage (20% to 50%) of annual price variations. 12 out of the 14 
products considered in our research were at the time of the survey on promotional sale in at least one 
of the stores; in fact, the number of stores offering the products considered as a promotional sale 
varies between 0 (MILKTDM and SPAGVOI) and 294 (MILKGRA). If we exclude MILKGRA, in 
49 of the 437 retail stores at least one of the remaining 13 products was offered on a promotional 
sale; in 18 of them there were at least two on special offer. The largest number of stores offering the 
product “on sale” is observed for MILKPARM (24) and YOGDAN (22). Surprisingly enough, only    
14 
 
in 5 cases was the lowest of the prices advertised as a special promotional sale the minimum 
observed price for that product; most often (in 7 cases out of 12) there were few retail stores selling 
the same item at a price below the minimum observed “on sale” price without highlighting that price 
as being a special offer. This seems to suggest a bounded rationality framework for the behaviour of 
at least some of the firms. If MILKGRA is excluded from the analysis, a positive linkage exists 
between the stores offering the product as a promotional sale as a percentage of the total number of 
stores selling that product, and the coefficient of variation of the price of the same product (figure 
4). On the contrary, if MILKGRA is included, clear evidence emerges for a linkage in the opposite 
direction. We thus conclude that promotional sales, if driven by a market-wide promotion by the 
producer have a lowering effect on price dispersion, while the contrary is true if they are the result 
of decisions taken at the retail firm level.  
 Are consumer prices higher in supermarkets than in traditional food retailers?  
  A specific characteristic of the market which is the focus of this study is the significant 
persistence of a large number of traditional, relatively small, food retailers. Because of their higher 
acquisition prices and, likely, operational costs with respect to those of supermarkets, traditional 
stores are expected to show higher retail prices. Ambrose (1979) found grocery prices to be, on 
average, lower in chain stores than in independent ones, and in large independent stores lower than 
in small ones. Our survey confirms this expectation: shopping at supermarkets is often, though not 
always, cheaper than in traditional stores (table 4).   The highest price is observed in a traditional 
store for 6 out of the 14 products and in a supermarket for 2 products (the maximum price is the 
same in the two groups of stores for the remaining 6 products). Supermarkets show the lowest 
observed price for 8 of the 14 products; for three products this is the case for traditional stores, while 
in the remaining three the minimum price in the two groups of stores is the same. The average price 
is lower in supermarkets for 11 products, but two products were cheaper, on average, in traditional 
retail stores.  
The statistical significance of the difference between average prices in supermarkets and traditional 
retail stores has been tested by estimating by OLS two very simple linear models:   
         πir =  Σj=1,2,…,14 δj x
j
ir  + α wir + εir               (1) 
        P ir =  Σ j=1,2,…,14  γj x
j
ir  + Σ j=1,2,…,14 βj z
j
ir + εir       (2) 
where Pir is the price of the r-th product (r = 1, 2, …, 14) in the i-th store; πir  is equal to Pir divided 
by the average price of the r-th product across all stores carrying it; x
j
ir is a dummy variable which 





ir is a dummy variable which equals 1 if j = r and the store is a supermarket, 0 
otherwise; δj , α, γj and βj are the parameters to be estimated; and εir are the error terms (results are 
shown in table 5).  
Model (1) allows us to assess the difference in prices in supermarkets and traditional retail stores 
jointly for all 14 products. Prices in supermarkets are, on average, lower than in traditional food 
stores by 3.9% and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. The 
estimated values of γj and βj in equation (2) are nothing but the average price of the j-th product in 
traditional retail stores, and the difference between the average price of the j-th product in 
supermarkets and in traditional retail stores, respectively. The tests show that, for 8 out of the 14 
products, the average price in the supermarkets was statistically significantly lower than that in 
traditional retail stores (in 5 cases at the 99% confidence level, in one case at the 95% confidence 
level and in the remaining 2 cases at the 90% level), while the contrary never happens, since in the 
other 6 cases the two average prices turn out not statistically different. 
Table 6 allows us to compare the cost of baskets of products, instead of considering them 
individually. Traditional retail stores, being much smaller in size, tend to offer a lower number of 
references than supermarkets; in fact, no traditional retail store carries all 14 food items, only two 
sell the full set but MILKTDM, and the most common basket of 10 products (that obtained by 
excluding MILKTDM, BABYFPLA, SPAGVOI and COFFEELAV) is sold by 10 traditional stores 
only. Nevertheless, the information in table 6 provides useful indications, complementing those 
which emerged when products were considered individually. The lowest cost of each basket is 
always found in a supermarket, but the same is also true for the highest cost. Beside the 13 products 
basket, which is sold by two traditional retail stores only, the average cost of the baskets considered 
is always lower in supermarkets, although average savings are relatively small (between 1.7% and 
2.5% of total expenditure). 
One interesting aspect of all this is the pricing behaviours of stores that are parts of the same 
chain. Most consumers, especially those who devote relatively little effort to  finding the cheapest 
store to do their food shopping, tend to believe supermarkets belonging to the same chain offer 
identical, or very similar, prices. According to theory, however, it should be otherwise, as this would 
imply that retail stores belonging to certain chains could be identified a priori as being cheaper than 
those belonging to certain other chains. To address this point table 7 provides information on price 
dispersion in supermarkets belonging to the 11 chains which in our sample have at least 6 stores; 
this means considering 159 supermarkets out of the 249 covered by the survey. When average prices 
in each of the chains are compared with average prices across all supermarkets in the sample one 
finds out that no chain shows a lower (or a higher) than average price for all 14 items. The number    
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of products offered at a higher than average price varies among the 11 chains between 4 and 12.  
58% of the average prices for the 14 products in the 11 chains are above the average calculated for 
each product across all supermarkets. However, the number of products sold at above or below 
average prices in a certain chain, alone, does not provide enough information to assess the advantage 
of shopping in that specific chain. Figure 5 gives the ratio between the average total cost of the 
basket of the 14 products in each chain of stores and the average cost of the same basket calculated 
for all supermarkets in the sample, and the number of products sold in the same chain at above 
average prices. A positive link between the two variables emerge. Yet this relationship should not be 
taken as a general rule. In fact, one of the chains with the largest number of items (11 out of 14) sold 
at a price above the average shows an average expenditure for the 14 products which is 2% below 
the average expenditure calculated across all supermarkets (SISA), and the largest average savings 
(6%) occur in a chain where 6 of the 14 products are sold at an above average price (STANDA) 
(table 7). This suggests (a) that different chains use different strategies in their pricing decisions, and 
(b) that at least some of those pricing a relatively large number of food items above average have 
other food items priced well below average, or, to put it differently, that chains offering (truly 
advantageous) promotional sales are, at the same time, often selling many other items at not-so-
advantageous prices. This is consistent with the conclusions reached in Griffith et al. (2009, pp. 111-
112), who found Tesco to be the supermarket chain where consumers saved the most, but, at the 
same time, 79 out of the 189 product groups considered were sold at above average prices.  
Is price dispersion larger within supermarkets than in traditional food retailers? 
Since supermarkets can be assumed to engage in more sophisticated pricing strategies than 
traditional retail stores, one would expect to find higher price dispersion among the former. 
However, this does not seem to be the case; in fact, the coefficients of variation of prices are higher 
in traditional retail stores for 10 of the 14 products and lower for three (in one case, BEERPERO, 
the two groups of stores show the same value of the coefficient) (table 4). Furthermore, wider price 
dispersion is not systematically associated to products for which stores show higher average retail 
prices; in fact, this is the case only for 7 products, while in 5 cases the group of stores showing the 
highest coefficient of variation is the one with the lowest average price (table 4).  
The opposite result emerges when the coefficients of variation for the cost of the baskets 
considered in table 6 are compared. The higher dispersion of the cost of the baskets observed in 
supermarkets is not in contradiction with the lower dispersion observed in the same group of stores 
for individual prices, as it may be the result of more careful pricing. However, the small number of 
traditional retail stores selling the four baskets considered in the analysis suggests we should be 
cautious when drawing conclusions on the differences in the variability between the two groups.     
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In general, price dispersion for individual products in supermarkets and traditional food retailers 
appears relatively close to that observed for the entire sample. What remains to be seen is whether 
the determinants of price dispersions are the same in supermarkets and traditional food retailers, or if 
the similar price dispersion observed is the result of different factors/behaviours in the two groups of 
stores.  
To sum up, it would be reasonable to expect price dispersion within supermarkets belonging to the 
same chain to be less than that observed across all supermarkets. The results of our survey, however, 
suggest that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, for 34% of the prices of the 14 products sold in 
the 11 supermarket chains with at least 6 stores in our sample, the coefficient of variation calculated 
for the stores belonging to the same chain (table 7) is larger than the one calculated considering all 
supermarkets.  
Are prices and price dispersion higher in smaller and rural communities than in urban settings? 
  In an urban setting, because of the greater density of retailers, consumer search costs are 
definitely lower. Hence, one can expect both lower prices and lower price dispersion. However, the 
results of empirical studies of the effects of competition on price dispersion are not conclusive. 
Ambrose (1979) compared grocery prices in retail stores located in inner city, suburban and rural 
areas. His results show higher prices in retail stores located in rural areas, followed by those in 
suburban and inner city areas, respectively. A negative relationship between price dispersion and 
seller density is also found by Barron et al. (2004) for the gasoline retail market. Lewis (2008) 
agrees with these results when considering the gasoline retail sector as a whole. On the contrary, 
when the market is split in two typologies of sellers –one consisting of stations belonging to the 
premium brand group and one grouping discount brands and independent (unbranded) stations, his 
estimates confirm the negative relationship for the group of discount and unbranded stations , but an 
insignificant, or weakly positive, relationship emerges for the premium brand sellers. Moreover,  
when price dispersion is measured for stations in the same area, rather than for the city as a whole, 
the relationship with station density for premium  brand sellers becomes strongly positive. Similarly, 
in the Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) study on the airline industry, competition has a negative effect on 
price dispersion. However, when they distinguish between routes characterized by relatively 
heterogeneous elasticities of demand and routes with a homogeneous customer base, the negative 
effect is more pronounced for the former.  
Another strand of papers maintains, on the contrary, the existence of a positive relationship 
between price dispersion and competitive intensity, including the classical paper by Borenstein and 
Rose (1994) and Anderson and de Palma (2005).     
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Differences in theoretical prescriptions and empirical results encourage further empirical 
investigation.  
In table 8 prices and price dispersion in the stores located in the Cosenza-Rende urban area are 
compared with those in the rest of the sample, where most stores are located in smaller towns and 
rural areas. 118 (27%) of the 437 retail stores in the sample fall in the urban area; the share of 
supermarkets in the two groups is practically the same (58% for the urban area, 56% in the rest of 
the sample). Average prices in the urban area are not systematically lower than those in smaller 
towns and rural areas. On the contrary, for 11 of the 14 products the average price is higher in the 
urban area. In table 9 the results obtained by estimating by OLS the following four simple models 
are presented: 
                          πir =  Σj=1,2,…,14 δj x
j
ir  + η kir + εir                        (3) 
                            πir =  Σj=1,2,…,14 δj x
j
ir  + α wir + η kir + εir                  (4) 
            P ir =  Σ j=1,2,…,14  γj x
j
ir  + Σ j=1,2,…,14 φj s
j
ir + εir      (5) 
      P ir =  Σ j=1,2,…,14  γj x
j
ir  + Σ j=1,2,…,14 φj s
j
ir + Σ j=1,2,…,14 βj z
j
ir + εir    (6) 
where kir is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the store is located in the Cosenza-Rende urban 
area, 0 otherwise; s
j
ir is a dummy variable which equals 1 if j = r and the store is located in the 
Cosenza-Rende urban area, 0 otherwise; δj , α, η, γj, φj and βj are the parameters to be estimated; and 
εir are the error terms.  
  When all products are considered jointly (Model 3), prices in the urban area are higher than those 
in smaller towns and rural areas by 1.2% (this difference is statistically significant at 99% 
confidence level). In fact, at average prices, the basket of the 14 products in the food retail stores 
located in the urban area is 1.6% more expensive than in the rest of the region (it costs €30.61 vs. 
€30.14). When differences due to the type of store (supermarket/traditional food store) are 
controlled for (Model 4) prices in the urban area are 1.3% higher than in smaller towns and rural 
areas. If products are considered individually (Model 5) prices are higher in the urban area for 11 of 
the 14 products, and for 4 the difference is statistically significant, although for one of these at 10% 
level only. On the contrary, prices are lower in the rural area for three products, only one of which at 
a statistically significant level (99%). Similar results emerge when price differences due to the type 
of store are controlled for (Model 6).    
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  Price dispersion measured by the coefficients of variation, on the contrary, is lower in the urban 
area for 9 of the 14 food products considered (table 8). Observed differences in price dispersion in 
the urban areas vis a vis smaller towns and rural areas are, in some cases, quite marked.  
  These results suggest that, while the greater density of sellers in the urban area definitely does 
not translate into increased price competition among retailers and lower prices, it does yield lower 
price dispersion. This means that differences in search costs across markets may have a limited 
impact on the level of prices, while in the presence of lower search costs sellers seem to be more 
careful in limiting price dispersion, which their customers may detect more easily. Our results are 
consistent with the model proposed by Waldeck (2008), where the mean price in a market for a 
homogeneous good turns out to be an increasing function of the search intensity (i.e. the proportion 
of informed consumers). Moreover, in Waldeck (2008) price dispersion is a reverse U-shaped 
function of the proportion of informed consumers.  Tang et al. (2010) test empirically if price 
dispersion is inverse U-shaped in the proportion of informed consumers, i.e. buyers who use 
shopbots to compare prices. They find that as shopbot usage increases, price dispersion decreases 
and don’t exclude that “as the share of informed consumers  approaches zero or one, price 
dispersion should be declining smoothly to zero” (p. 585). Our results show that in an urban area, 
where the density of stores is higher than in a rural area and one can expect consumers to be better 
informed given the existence of lower search costs, there tends to be less price dispersion.  
Do low/high price setters remain so over time? 
  Theory suggests that retailers are expected over time to vary in both directions the prices of the 
different goods they sell. In fact, as discussed above, temporal price dispersion is a necessary 
condition for spatial price dispersion, otherwise consumers would be able to identify from 
experience stores selling a given product at a lower price and would not buy it from stores offering it 
at a higher price (Varian, 1980). Lach (2002) found evidence of most stores in his sample falling 
over a 48 month period in both the lower and the upper quartiles of the price distribution of the three 
food products considered. Hong et al. (2002) prove empirically that a negative serial correlation of 
prices and quantities for storable goods exists because of consumer inventories. Their results also 
confirm that there is a positive relationship between current sales and the price in the previous 
period. 
In order to assess the temporal pattern of prices, prices surveyed in 2010 were compared with 
prices in 2009 for the 178 retailers in our sample (out of 437) involved in an identical survey 
conducted between April  2 and 5, 2009. In figure 6, for each of the 14 food products, normalized 
prices in 2010 are plotted against normalized prices in the same store the previous year (the number 
of stores varies from product to product, because only stores which carried the product in both years    
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are considered). In figure 6, stores represented by dots falling in the first and third quadrants priced 
the specific product above and below the average price, respectively, in both years; if temporal price 
dispersion did not exist, all stores would lie on the 45° line crossing the origin. Stores in the second 
(fourth) quadrant show for that product a more marked temporal price dispersion, as they did set the 
price above (below) average in 2010 and below (above) average the year before.  
The statistical significance of the sign of the relationship between prices for the same product in 
the same store surveyed one year apart has been tested by estimating by OLS the following  models: 
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ir is equal to Pir in 2010 divided by the average price in 2010 of the r-th product across all 
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ir ; φ, ψj ,υ and ξj  are the parameters to be estimated; and εir are the error terms 
(results are shown in table 10).  
Over time pricing strategies do not show a negative relation between prices in 2009 and 2010, 
with stores who offered a given product at an above (below) average price in 2009 more likely to 
offer the same product at a below (above) average price one year later. On the contrary, when the 
relationship between prices in 2009 and 2010 is assessed jointly for all products (Model 7) this is 
positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level; when the linkage is assessed 
product by product (Model 8), in 13 out of the 14 instances retailers who offered the product at an 
above or below average price in 2009 were more likely to do the same one year later; the positive 
sign of the coefficient is statistically significant, at different levels of confidence, for 8 of the 13 
products. These results are confirmed when the effect on the price relationship of the type of store is 
controlled for (Models 9 and 10). However, in the case of supermarkets, on average, the positive 
linkage is weaker (statistically at 99% confidence level) than in traditional food stores (Model 9); 
when the same effect is assessed product by product, results suggest a similar conclusion for 12 of 
the 14 products, although only for two products is the negative sign of the coefficient statistically 
significant (at 5% and 10% significance level). The store effect is never sufficient to make the sign 
of the temporal price relation for products sold in supermarkets switch with respect to that observed    
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in traditional food stores. Finally, in the few cases where a negative relationship emerged in Models 
8, 9 and 10 between prices in 2009 and prices in 2010, this turned out statistically no different from 
zero.  
These results, at least in principle, could be consistent with retailers offering, over time, certain 
products at above average prices and others at below average price, without revealing an equally 
stable overall pricing profile, i.e. their prices consistently being, overall, either low or high. To 
check if this is actually the case we considered the same-store cost in 2009 and 2010 for a given 
basket of products. Even limiting the number of products to 10, only 23 of the 178 stores involved in 
the two surveys sold those products at both times (figure 7). Even with all the necessary caution, 
given the small number of stores, the indication which emerges is that those stores which charged, 
overall, relatively higher prices in 2009 were doing the same one year on. 
Our results seem consistent with those of Bahadir-Lust et al. (2007) who find evidence of 
persistence over time of the position of stores in the cross sectional price distribution. Similar 
conclusions are also in Baylis and Perloff (2002) regarding non food products. 
One possible explanation is firm heterogeneity - in terms of services offered, such as number of 
references, opening hours, proximity, parking convenience and reputation - and consumer 
heterogeneity – in terms of their shopping preferences. Differences in store-specific consumer 
demand, such as a those due to the store being located in an area with a lower (or higher) than 
average per capita income, may also play a role.  
5. Conclusions  
The aim of this paper has been to contribute to the empirical literature on price dispersion by 
assessing its extent and determinants for a group of perfectly homogeneous food products. As far as 
we know, this is the first attempt to address the price dispersion issue in a retail market characterized 
by a marked heterogeneity of sellers as a result of the persistence of a large number of relatively 
small traditional food retailers, side by side with large supermarkets. 
Some of the results reached in this specific market setting confirm those obtained elsewhere, 
while others may offer original insights to the empirical literature on price dispersion. 
 Although (i) the products considered are perfectly homogeneous and (ii) frequently purchased, 
(iii) the number of sellers high, and (iv) search costs relatively low, the observed price dispersion is 
quite high. Its magnitude has been found to be of the same order detected for food products by 
several other studies in very different environments, suggesting that greater heterogeneity of firms, 
because of the persistence of a large number of traditional food retailers, does not lead to increased 
price dispersion.     
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The extent of price dispersion observed suggests that monopolistic competition prevails among 
sellers as a result of their heterogeneity in terms of services rendered. This is consistent with Carlson 
and McAfee (1983) and McAfee (1995). Further evidence of heterogeneity of firms’ characteristics 
which can be appreciated by consumers (i.e. different from heterogeneity in operational and 
procurement costs, which is another factor suggested to explain price dispersion) is provided by the 
circumstance that, in our study, many retailers selling at relatively high (low) prices in 2010 were 
doing the same one year earlier. 
High price dispersion in the presence of low search costs and frequently repeated purchases signal 
that these factors are counteracted in consumer decisions about searching by the relatively low 
prices of the commodities considered (which reduce the expected marginal benefits from search 
efforts). Seller pricing behaviors suggest that consumers are more sensitive to absolute price 
differences than percentage ones, i.e. they are more interested in detecting a 10% price difference 
which translates in savings of 2€ than a 50% price difference involving saving 50 cents. 
Promotional sales are found (here and elsewhere) to contribute in a significant way to price 
dispersion. Based on the results of our survey, however, we have been able to conclude that this is 
not always the case. In fact, if the promotional sale is market-wide, decided by the manufacturer, it 
reduces, rather than increases, spatial price dispersion, while the contrary is true if promotional sales 
are the result of decisions taken by retailers.  
When prices in an urban area (where the spatial concentration of sellers is much higher and, 
hence, consumer search costs significantly lower) have been compared with those in smaller towns 
and rural areas, differences in search costs proved to have a significant, albeit limited, positive effect 
on price dispersion. In agreement with Waldeck (2008), the potentially higher degree of competition 
deriving from the lower search costs and high density of sellers did not yield lower prices – on the 
contrary they were higher, on average, for 11 of the 14 products considered - confirming the 
hypothesis that food retail is an imperfectly competitive market.  
Supermarkets proved to be often, but not always, less expensive than traditional retailers. Yet, 
average savings from food shopping at supermarkets were extremely low. This confirms McAfee’s 
(1995) conclusion that prices across goods tend to be negatively correlated and helps explain the 
persistence of traditional retail stores - consumers keep shopping at them because they are often not 
significantly more expensive than supermarkets. In addition, if factors other than prices are 
considered, traditional retail stores provide fewer of the services many consumers ask for, and often 
of a lower quality, but they may provide other services which are not strong points for supermarkets, 
such as a convenient location and the social pleasure deriving from more personal interactions while    
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shopping. On the other hand, the economic squeeze traditional retailers face (between the constraint 
to contain prices, and higher operational and acquisition costs) is confirmed by their steady decline. 
Finally, the results of our study suggest that there is no one-rule-fits-them-all for firm strategic 
behaviors, as different groups of sellers adopt different pricing decisions. While explaining these 
differences and their motivations is beyond the scope of this study, our results show that such 
differences exist both between one store and another, and within different supermarket chains.    
  In conclusion, our study confirms that significant price dispersion occurs even where, according 
to theory, it should be low. The products being homogeneous, purchases frequently repeated, the 
number of sellers high, and search costs relatively low did not suffice to keep price dispersion low. 
The results presented in this study suggest that what is more important in explaining price dispersion 
is the contemporaneous occurrence of retailer heterogeneity (in terms of services rendered), and 
consumer heterogeneity (in terms of propensity to search and preferences regarding how to shop, i.e. 
“supermarket lovers” vs. “social shoppers”), which makes it possible for a monopolistic competition 
market structure to emerge and for a large number of traditional food retail stores to remain in 
business.   
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Fig. 1   Label of the “GRANAROLO milk” at the time of the survey, with the “suggested” promotional 
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Fig. 3 Price frequency distribution for the 14 food products* 
 
 
*:   the extreme values of the intervals used to generate the frequency distributions are defined by using the same per cent differences 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 4  Percentage of stores selling the product as a promotional sale and price coefficient  
of variation for13 food products (excluding MILKGRA*). 
 
*:   The percentage of stores offering MILKGRA at the promotional sale price is 83% and the price coefficient of 





Fig. 5  Number of average prices above the average calculated across all supermarkets  
in the sample and ratio between the total average cost of the 14 products and  
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Fig. 7  Same store cost of 10-product basket in 2009 and 2010 (23 stores) 
































1M I L K G R A Granarolo‐Centrali del latte di Calabria, Milk, whole, pastourized, 
"Alta qualità", plastic (PET) bottle, 1 lt
2M I L K T D M Torre di Mezzo, Milk, whole, pastourized, glass bottle, 0.75 lt
3M I L K P A R MParmalat, Milk, whole, UHT, "Bontà e gusto", plastic (PET) bottle, 1 lt





8W A T E R L E VLevissima, mineral water, 6 plastic bottle pack, 1.5 lt each
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x1 1,0241 (,) *** 1,3209 (,01) ***
x2 1,0268 (,01) *** 1,3774 (,01) ***
x3 1,0277 (,01) *** 1,2841 (,02) ***
x4 1,0224 (,01) *** 1,3934 (,03) ***
x5 1,0235 (,01) *** 3,5780 (,05) ***
x6 1,0242 (,01) *** 2,7705 (,02) ***
x7 1,0242 (,01) *** 1,9257 (,02) ***
x8 1,0235 (,01) *** 3,0513 (,03) ***
x9 1,0230 (,01) *** 2,4249 (,03) ***
x10 1,0300 (,01) *** 6,0850 (,08) ***
x11 1,0255 (,01) *** 0,7943 (,01) ***
x12 1,0233 (,01) *** 1,1422 (,02) ***
x13 1,0315 (,01) *** 1,0213 (,02) ***
x14 1,0273 (,01) *** 2,6562 (,03) ***
w ‐0,0393 (,) ***
z1 ‐0,0178 (,01) **
z2 ‐0,0238 (,01) *
z3 0,0306 (,02)  
z4 ‐0,1693 (,04) ***
z5 ‐0,2963 (,05) ***
z6 ‐0,2011 (,03) ***
z7 ‐0,0912 (,02) ***
z8 ‐0,0852 (,04) *
z9 0,0101 (,03)  
z10 ‐0,0021 (,08)  
z11 ‐0,0550 (,01) ***
z12 ‐0,0087 (,02)  
z13 ‐0,0245 (,02)  



















13 products: all products 
but MILKTDM
12 products: all products 
but MILKTDM and 
BABYFPLA








15 27 34 51 72
27,64 26,23 23,73 22,47 20,19
31,89 30,50 27,75 27,02 24,43
1,15 1,16 1,17 1,20 1,21
29,51 28,02 25,60 24,54 22,03
1,08 1,05 1,09 1,13 1,09
3,6% 3,7% 4,3% 4,6% 4,9%
0 269 1 0
… 27,48 24,93 24,03 21,68
… 28,25 27,00 26,28 23,67
… 1,03 1,08 1,09 1,09
… 27,87 26,03 25,13 22,59
… 0,54 0,85 0,79 0,71
… 1,9% 3,3% 3,1% 3,1%
Minimum cost
Table 6  Cost dispersion of selected product baskets in supermarkets and traditional retail stores (costs in €).




Average cost (µ) 
Standard deviation (б) 
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/µ x 100)
Supermarkets
Traditional retail stores
Number of retail stores selling the specific basket
Maximum cost
Cmax / Cmin
Average cost (µ) 
Standard deviation (б) 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































x1 0,9925 (,) *** 1,0205 (,) *** 1,3156 (,) *** 1,3273 (,01) ***
x2 0,9964 (,) *** 1,0228 (,01) *** 1,3658 (,01) *** 1,3814 (,01) ***
x3 0,9968 (,01) *** 1,0245 (,01) *** 1,2994 (,01) *** 1,2800 (,02) ***
x4 0,9974 (,01) *** 1,0193 (,01) *** 1,2991 (,02) *** 1,4022 (,03) ***
x5 0,9966 (,01) *** 1,0203 (,01) *** 3,3650 (,03) *** 3,5435 (,05) ***
x6 0,9973 (,01) *** 1,0211 (,01) *** 2,6509 (,02) *** 2,7685 (,03) ***
x7 0,9963 (,01) *** 1,0212 (,01) *** 1,8555 (,01) *** 1,9088 (,02) ***
x8 0,9968 (,01) *** 1,0202 (,01) *** 2,9921 (,03) *** 3,0431 (,04) ***
x9 0,9975 (,01) *** 1,0200 (,01) *** 2,4228 (,02) *** 2,4178 (,03) ***
x10 0,9976 (,01) *** 1,0267 (,01) *** 6,0493 (,04) *** 6,0601 (,08) ***
x11 0,9967 (,01) *** 1,0226 (,01) *** 0,7584 (,01) *** 0,7908 (,01) ***
x12 0,9984 (,01) *** 1,0209 (,01) *** 1,1257 (,01) *** 1,1327 (,02) ***
x13 1,0010 (,01) *** 1,0290 (,01) *** 1,0015 (,01) *** 1,0189 (,02) ***
x14 0,9968 (,01) *** 1,0246 (,01) *** 2,6388 (,02) *** 2,6480 (,03) ***
k 0,0120 (,) *** 0,0126 (,) ***
w ‐0,0394 (,) ***
s1 ‐0,0195 (,01) *** ‐0,0203 (,01) ***
s2 ‐0,0114 (,01) ‐0,0119 (,01)  
s3 0,0158 (,02) 0,0156 (,02)  
s4 ‐0,0476 (,04) ‐0,0389 (,04)  
s5 0,1322 (,06) ** 0,1266 (,05) **
s6 0,0113 (,04) 0,0078 (,03)  
s7 0,0672 (,03) ** 0,0659 (,02) ***
s8 0,0309 (,04) 0,0281 (,04)  
s9 0,0325 (,03) 0,0320 (,03)  
s10 0,1253 (,06) * 0,1268 (,06) **
s11 0,0139 (,01) 0,0176 (,01) *
s12 0,0531 (,02) ** 0,0536 (,02) **
s13 0,0139 (,02) 0,0168 (,02)  
s14 0,0514 (,05) 0,0531 (,05)  
z1 ‐0,0186 (,01) **
z2 ‐0,0240 (,01) *
z3 0,0305 (,02)  
z4 ‐0,1676 (,04) ***
z5 ‐0,2943 (,05) ***
z6 ‐0,2010 (,03) ***
z7 ‐0,0905 (,02) ***
z8 ‐0,0845 (,04) *
z9 0,0088 (,03)  
z10 ‐0,0150 (,08)  
z11 ‐0,0558 (,01) ***
z12 ‐0,0105 (,02)  
z13 ‐0,0260 (,02)  

















Table 9  Testing average price differences between the urban area (Cosenza-Rende) and rest of the sample (smaller towns and 
rural areas)
Model 4, dep. variable πir Model 3, dep. variable πir Model 5, dep. variable pir






ir 0,1327 (,03) ***
t1 0,0074 (,03) ‐0,0139 (,04) 0,0087 (,03)
t2 0,0447 (,02) ** 0,0447 (,01) *** 0,0447 (,02) ***
t3 0,1426 (,08) * 0,1397 (,08) * 0,1426 (,08) *
t4 0,0781 (,12) 0,0651 (,11) 0,0575 (,11)
t5 0,4300 (,11) *** 0,4156 (,11) *** 0,4036 (,11) ***
t6 0,2293 (,1) ** 0,2058 (,1) ** 0,2006 (,1) **
t7 0,1674 (,1) * 0,1633 (,1) * 0,1582 (,1)
t8 0,1544 (,06) ** 0,1466 (,06) ** 0,1411 (,07) **
t9 0,0438 (,11) 0,0479 (,1) 0,0446 (,1)
t10 0,0863 (,13) 0,0785 (,13) 0,0835 (,13)
t11 0,0312 (,04) 0,0275 (,04) 0,0252 (,04)
t12 0,3302 (,17) ** 0,3277 (,17) ** 0,3289 (,17) **
t13 0,4806 (,13) *** 0,4663 (,13) *** 0,4738 (,13) ***
t14 ‐0,0801 (,13) ‐0,0800 (,13) ‐0,0801 (,13)
w ‐0,0117 (,) ***
z1 0,0007 (,)
z2 ‐0,0056 (,01)
z3 0,0002 (,01)  
z4 ‐0,0185 (,03)
z5 ‐0,0214 (,01) *
z6 ‐0,0143 (,01)
z7 ‐0,0265 (,01) **
z8 ‐0,0199 (,02)
z9 ‐0,0024 (,01)  
z10 ‐0,0042 (,01)  
z11 ‐0,0194 (,01)
z12 ‐0,0062 (,01)  
z13 ‐0,0056 (,01)  






1531 1531 1531 1531




Model 7M o d e l  8M o d e l  9M o d e l  10
22,68 4,23 5,09 2,95
0,0197 0,0381 0,0441 0,0476